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A steep fall in crude prices allied with lower output will decrease the Iranian government’s 
foreign revenues significantly. The Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) has lost 30% of its value in the 
last four months, which points to a sizable economic slowdown in the near future. Perhaps Iran is 
among a handful of countries that has not properly planned to combat any potential economic crisis 
in the face of lower oil prices and the global financial meltdown that began to show its visage in the 
middle of 2007. The substantial inflow of petrodollars to the government’s account coupled with the 
faulty assumption that the oil prices will continue to rise triggered the government to infuse billions 
of dollars into the economic and banking system. Iranian officials have just begun to accept the new 
global circumstances and are after drafting a budget for the next Iranian year to ride out the financial 
turmoil. The administration is planning to eliminate energy subsidies and reduce its price controls in 
the new fiscal budget planning in order to reduce the massive deficit. It is indeed ironic from a 
government that has no belief in principles of a free market economy and denied it in the past to 
draw such a plan, many economists have stated. Whether the government has realized its past 
mistakes, is unknown and whether the new budget and policy will ease the current economic 
problems, remains to be seen! A more important question is whether the central bank and the 
administration will be able to employ the available monetary and fiscal tools to tackle the profound 
upcoming economic challenges, since they already tied their hands by their past mistakes and beliefs. 
Overall, the next few months or perhaps years will undoubtedly be very challenging times for the 
system. 
Oil export earnings could dive considerably as crude prices are projected to average between 
$30 and $40 a barrel and the oil production will likely decline following OPEC’s collective decision 
to slash supplies to offset a sharp drop in demand. The decline in petro prices has a direct impact on 
the financial and economic condition, since oil revenues are the core source of income for the 
socioeconomic development. The government forced the banks to offer billions of dollars of credit 
to the seekers for agricultural, production, and real estate projects without setting any sensible 
requirements for their economic justification. The injection of these funds into the economy formed 
the phenomenon of Dutch disease in the country. As a result, a large amount of borrowed funds for 
agricultural and production projects found their way to real estate and other more lucrative 
investments.‎1 Many of these borrowers invested billions of dollars both in the domestic and regional 
property markets such as Dubai that was undergoing a boom of its own. 
After a year when leading economies slid into recession, the forecasts paint an even grimmer 
picture for the 12 months ahead. Recession is expected for most advanced economies and a growth 
decrease for emerging economies; hence, many economists urged world governments to spend more 
to boost domestic demand to prevent this recession developing into a great depression similar to the 
downturn of the 1930s. Because of the downturn in economic activity and overall demand around 
the world that have led to much lower commodity prices today, lower inflation rates for many 
economies and even deflation for some other economies are coming into effect. Consequently, 
central banks and governments around the world have resorted to expansionary fiscal and monetary 
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policy by deficit spending, offering stimulus packages, lowering reserve requirements, tax cuts, and 
lowering interest rates to boost their economies and stabilize prices. 
Though, the situation in Iran is rather different. The government carried out expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policy conversely during the times of economic growth and increasing inflation. 
Ahmadinejad's extravagant spending from the oil income in combination with lowered lending 
interest rates less than the average inflation rate and deposit rates triggered a huge amount of 
demand for borrowing despite many warnings he received from Iranian experts. They stated that 
excessive capital injection not only would not increase economic growth, but also would place the 
economy in an unwanted economic situation. It is easy to throw money at the market and people. 
But, it's not so easy, and certainly not popular, to manage the process of taking it back without 
creating a whole new set of problems for the economy and investors. As a result, far too much 
lending went to further increase the money base and inflation and to encourage purely speculative 
activity in the real estate market. Therefore, it distorted the markets, inflated asset prices, increased 
the fragility of the financial system, and served no constructive objective in the real economy. 
Imprudent expansionary economic policy during the economic growth times and the inflow 
of capital to real property as the result of that have encountered the government and central bank 
with two major challenges: 1- a substantial amount of budget deficit and exploitation of 
accommodative monetary and fiscal policy to revive the economy and 2- A credit crisis in the 
banking system. 
Budget Deficit and Economic Policy 
It is expected that the government’s earnings be reduced via its four different sources of 
income: 1- oil revenues, 2- amounts of oil exports, 3- exports of petrochemical and non-oil products 
and services, and 4- taxes. 
The government just completed planning for the next fiscal budget (March 20th 2009 – 
March 20th 2010) based on an oil price of $37.5 a barrel. According to its current planning, the 
budget will encounter a deficit of $30 billion if the average crude price remains within the range of 
$35 to $40 a barrel, which comprises 1/3 of the next year’s fiscal budget. Even many experts believe 
that the deficit figure is very optimistic and the government will not be able to achieve many of its 
predicted earnings. In the past three years, the fiscal budget has grown significantly due to the inflow 
of petrodollars.‎2&‎3 
During its tenure, the present government has poorly supervised the economy and showed 
little discipline in managing its finances besides its continual interference into central bank’s affairs. 
Every year it had to submit legislation to the Majles (Iranian Parliament) several times for 
supplementary budget amendments to tap into the Oil Stabilization Fund as well as to borrow from 
the central bank. Therefore, in the upcoming Iranian year if the government continues its 
mismanagement and acts disorderly, the figure for the budget deficit will be much larger. 
Deficit spending in a modern economy is not necessarily a bad practice if it is done correctly. 
It does not inevitably represent financial risk to either the government or the public. On the 
contrary, sometimes attempts to balance the budget can easily be counterproductive, especially 
during recessionary times. When the economy is sluggish or in recession, deficit spending helps 
support aggregate demand and production needed for recovery. Nevertheless, the question is how 
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the money should be spent? Many economists suggest that during recessionary times with low 
inflation the money should be spent on infrastructure projects to increase employment, which will 
boost demand, when prices are falling due to deflation or disinflation. 
In a modern economy to help pay for a fiscal budget deficit, the government raises capital by 
selling debt to the public. Also, the central bank buys securities to lower the short-term interest rate 
to its desired value and provide for growth of the money supply. By applying this tactic, the money 
base remains unchanged or changes based on the desired interest rate and therefore inflation stays in 
check. On the other hand, high inflation is almost due to a huge budget deficit, which the 
government is unwilling or unable to finance in the ordinary way by borrowing in the capital markets 
that maintains the money base. Instead of cutting the deficit, the government prints money or 
borrows it from the central bank, which amounts to the same thing. The result then leads to an 
increase in the money base and hence inflation. 
The latter is the case for Iran. In general, the government sells the petrodollars to the central 
bank and instead receives tomans for its budget. For the past few years, the central bank has printed 
trillions of tomans to exchange with billions of dollars of the government’s petro earnings. In these 
critical times, both the government and central bank are crippled in employing accommodative 
monetary and fiscal measures to revive the economy that is already experiencing a slowdown 
because of their past policies. The government has frantically been openhanded in exhausting petro 
earnings and lowering interest rates that led to higher inflation and asset prices. At present when the 
economy needs a lift by government spending, tax cuts, and lower interest rates, previous policies 
have made the situation very difficult for any easing. To cope with the budget deficit, the 
administration will have the choice of cutting spending (contractionary policy), reduce subsidies, 
increasing taxes, borrowing from the central bank (printing more money), selling participation bonds 
(government bonds), borrowing from foreign sources, or increasing the foreign exchange rate 
(currently set to 950 tomans per dollar for the new budget.) 
By cutting spending, in particular for development projects, the administration will add to 
the fire of unemployment that is already officially around 11% but unofficially more than 15%. By 
reducing subsidies, the government is planning to hand out targeted cash to the people, so it will not 
help. By borrowing from the central bank, the monetary base will increase, and as a result it will give 
a boost to the already high inflation rate. By increasing taxes, businesses will undergo more liquidity 
pressure when they need it more. By selling participation bonds, the government will be able to 
collect some of the stray money and pump it back to the development projects. However, there are 
doubts whether the government can raise a substantial amount of capital by selling these bonds 
unless it increases their yield a few percentage points more than the average inflation rate. Currently, 
the yield for the bonds is set to 19% while the average inflation rate is about 26%. By attempting to 
borrow from foreign sources, because of US and UN Security Council sanctions besides the 
ongoing global credit crunch, it seems highly unlikely that any foreign governments will be too 
enthusiastic to financially support the government of Iran. By increasing the foreign exchange rate, 
the government will be able to receive more tomans against the dollars that it sells to the central 
bank. It seems that the last one is the most viable option that the government has, considering the 
fact that the current rate is by far undervalued.‎5 Yet, it will not be easy to increase the rate suddenly 
as the demand to convert tomans to dollars will sharply increase. 
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By adopting any of these approaches, the government will face a grave challenge 
nonetheless. Perhaps serious stagflation is inevitable. For the government to fight inflation, it has no 
choice but to curb spending, increase interest rates, and reduce liquidity and hence bring the 
economy to a halt to kill high inflation. However, this will bring about high unemployment and 
deeper recession that may lead to social unrest. This is the risk that the government has to take 
eventually to normalize the economic condition. 
Credit Crisis 
Iranian banks have the credit crisis of their own. The current credit crisis in Iran has no 
relation with the global credit crisis whereas its roots may be found in the unsystematic interference 
of the government into central bank’s affairs by imposing policies that were out of the scope of 
government’s responsibility such as lowering the interest rates and forcing the banks to lend funds 
to loan applicants without requiring a viable business plan or conducting any supervision. The banks 
often had to borrow from the central bank to provide the funds. This policy has weakened the 
banking system considerably and made it undercapitalized. Substantial amounts of delinquent 
payments from the borrowers have shown on banks’ balance sheets. According to central bank 
governor Mahmud Bahmani the total amount of delinquent payments is estimated to be $30 to $40 
billion.‎6 Now, these banks have tremendous difficulty lending money. As a result, many companies, 
businesses, and development projects that require borrowing for their operations have faced a great 
hurdle. 
As it was previously stated, because of the formation of Dutch disease due to high oil prices 
and over injection of money into the system, considerable amounts of capital were funneled into the 
local and regional real estate markets. Thus, it made real property as a non-tradable asset heavily 
inflated. The regional real estate markets, particularly Dubai and Abu Dhabi were booming too. 
Iranian banks offered most of their capital to be invested in fast return economic units and other 
development projects. Many economists warned the government that the tactics of lending to 
achieve fast returns had been examined and failed in other countries such as Eastern bloc nations. In 
view of the fact that neither did the banks impose any supervision nor did any of these projects have 
viable business plans, the investors often initiated the plans but later redirected the capital to real 
estate and equity investments.‎4 Besides, the unfriendly business environment due to inappropriate 
economic policies and over regulation aggravated the situation. In both Iran and Arab countries of 
the Persian Gulf, in particular the UAE (mainly Dubai), property prices skyrocketed. Property sold 
like hot cakes for the past few years. However, because of a decline in oil prices and the ongoing 
global credit crunch, demand has slumped as panicking investors and creditors fled the markets. In 
other words, Dutch disease started to fade away as a less amount of petro dollars entered the 
financial system.  
Since their peaks, property prices both in Iran and Dubai have dropped nearly 20 to 30% 
and they are expected to continue their decline. Many sellers are even willing to sell their estate less 
than the market price, but there are no buyers to be found. Many of them had a plan to purchase 
property and then sell it in a few months later to pocket a quick profit. Now, they are trapped in big 
sums of loans and properties with considerable depreciated prices. Many of these investors have 
discontinued their monthly loan payments and thus defaulted on their loans. Furthermore, the fast 
return economic concept has not been able to bear fruit either. Most of the economic units have not 
been able to reach profitability. Currently, many of them need additional funds to continue. 
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Consequently, Iranian investors have encountered a significant difficulty to make their payments to 
the Iranian banks. There are no clear statistics that show how much the banks have exposure to the 
real estate mortgages. It is likely that a significant part of business and personal loans has been 
invested in real estate. 
Some of Iranian policymakers close to the government are still making cheering statements 
about the Iran’s non-existence exposure to subprime loans and the global credit crisis. But they have 
stayed hushed about heavy investments in inflated local and regional property markets as well as the 
increasing number of payment defaults. There are high possibilities that further economic weakness 
leads to more bad debts within the banking system. Furthermore, many expatriate Iranians who 
transferred their money from foreign banks to Iranian banks to exploit high yields that the Iranian 
banks offer with nearly fixed exchange rates may soon move their funds back to their foreign banks 
if they lose faith in the financial system. The premise is also valid for high net worth Iranians who 
own a business or have a stake in Iran. This will additionally put pressure on the banking system and 
the undervalued exchange rates.‎7 
Government’s economic policy of the last three years has failed. Ahmadinejad 
Administration’s shortsightedness has cost the economy a fortune. At a time that Iran could have 
accumulated tens of billions of dollars in reserves, officials are pondering to borrow from foreign 
sources to weather the turmoil. Many Iranian economists believe that the newly drafted budget is 
unrealistic and contains hidden budget shortages and discrepancies in addition to its known massive 
deficit. It is highly unpromising that the government will be able to properly manage the new fiscal 
budget considering the upcoming budget deficit of $30 billion partnered with the delinquent 
payments of $30 to $40 billion to the banking system and the upcoming foreign debt payments. 
Iranian statesmen have no choice but to eventually accept the principles of free market economics 
and private ownership of the economy. Half baked policies and central planning have inflicted 
indescribable damage to the country and people. May this domestic crisis be a good lesson for the 
policy makers in the future. 
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